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WARDEN

ment controversy may be puzzled
ewcomers
to the
capital punishby
ubiquitous
references
to the
common law writ of habeas corpus.
What, you may ask, does the Great
Writ have to do with the death penalty?
The answer is: virtually everything. The
lower federal courts have no ordinary
appellate jurisdiction to review state
criminal judgments for error. They adjudicate federal constitutional claims in
death penalty cases primarily by entertaining habeas corpus petitions from
death row prisoners. But for federal
habeas corpus, capital sentences
imposed for state criminal offenses
would be examined only in state court
and, occasionally, in the Supreme
Court (which does, of course, have
appellate jurisdiction to review state
judgments for federal error).
Conceptually, it works this way. A
state prisoner under sentence of death
files a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a U.S. district court. That petition
alleges that the prisoner is being held in
custody in violation of federal law. The
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warden responds that the prisoner is
lawfully detained on the basis of a criminal conviction and a capital sentence as
yet unexecuted. At that point, the district
court is in a position to examine the prisoner's claims that the conviction or sen-

tence cannot justify his or her detention,
because state authorities violated the
prisoner's federal rights in the course of
the state criminal prosecution.
If the district court concludes that the
prisoner's detention violates federal law,
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the court (sometimes) can order the warden to release the prisoner from further
restraint. As a practical matter, the court
will order the prisoner released only if
the state fails to cure the federal error
within a reasonable time (usually by giving the prisoner another trial or sentencing proceeding). Modern statutes and
rules obscure this conceptual framework. As often as not, federal court adjudication in a habeas case looks like
appellate review, albeit appellate review
attended by a host of special procedural
arrangements.
The federal courts have had the
authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus since 1789 and to do so on behalf of
prisoners in state custody since 1867. In
the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme
Court elaborated the writ's function with
respect to state criminal convictions in a
series of famous opinions by Justices
Holmes, Frankfurter, and Brennan. In the
1960s, habeas corpus provided the vehicle by which the lower federal courts
enforced the Supreme Court's innovations
in constitutional criminal procedure.
In the 1970s and 1980s, however,
the Court developed restrictive procedural doctrines to govern federal habeas
proceedings. The Court typically
explained those doctrines as attempts to
reduce friction between the states and
state courts, on the one hand, and the
federal courts, on the other. Practically
speaking, the Court's doctrines postponed or foreclosed federal court adjudication of prisoners' federal claims.
They continue to do that today.
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Congress has also limited federal
court adjudication of state prisoners' federal claims, particularly in death penalty
cases. The Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
restricts federal habeas in numerous
ways. Proponents of that act regarded
federal court authority to entertain
habeas petitions from death row prisoners as a threat to capital punishment
itself. They insisted that prisoners under
sentence of death sought relief from the
federal courts only to extend litigationand thus to postpone lawful executions.
In contrast, proponents of AEDPA meant
to promote capital punishment by curbing the federal courts' authority to adjudicate claims advanced in petitions by
prisoners on death row. In some
respects, AEDPA fortified the Supreme
Court's already restrictive doctrines; in
other respects, AEDPA established additional limitations.
The American Bar Association (ABA)
has always recognized the link between
the death penalty and federal habeas
corpus. This organization filed amicus
curiae briefs in many of the Supreme
Court cases in which the Court considered ever more restrictive rules for
habeas cases. The thesis of those briefs
was that if capital punishment is to be
used at all, it should be used only after
careful consideration of prisoners' federal claims. That careful consideration in
turn requires federal court examination
of claims as a sequel to state court proceedings. The ABA opposed the enactment of AEDPA.

Most of the provisions in AEDPA create procedural requirements that prisoners must satisfy before federal courts can
consider their claims. The ostensible
purpose of those procedural requirements is to streamline and expedite
habeas cases in federal court, but the
new procedural demands are hopelessly
complicated and typically make habeas
litigation even more protracted than it
was previously. The result, sad to say, is
that federal habeas corpus is bogged
down in Byzantine procedural snarls that
not only frustrate the enforcement of
constitutional rights but also squander
time and resources.
One provision in AEDPA, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1), is more substantive. That
provision recognizes that in the typical
case a prisoner seeking relief from a
federal court was previously refused
relief on the same grounds in state
court. If the previous state court adjudication was "on the merits," Section
2254(d)(1) bars a federal court from
granting relief to the prisoner, unless
the state adjudication of the claim
"resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States."
In Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495
(2000), the Supreme Court construed
this new provision to mean that a federal court's decision that the prisoner was
convicted or sentenced to death in violation of the Constitution does not, in
and of itself, enable the federal court to
grant relief. If a state court adjudicated
the merits of the prisoner's claims and
reached a different result, the federal
court can save the prisoner from execution only if the state court decision
against the prisoner was not only wrong
but unreasonably wrong.
Taken together, the Supreme Court's
restrictive doctrines and the additional limits established by AEDPA undermine the
ability of federal courts to vindicate federal
rights in habeas corpus proceedings. This is
why efforts to redress the many difficulties
with capital punishment must necessarily
be complemented by parallel efforts to
refurbish an ancient remedial vehicle: the
writ of habeas corpus.
Larry Yackle teaches at Boston University
School of Law. He has written a number of
articles and books on federal habeas corpus.
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